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A Theory of Contract Law under
Conditions of Radical Judicial Error
Eric A. Posner1
Ian Macneil famously argued that earlier contracts scholarship
followed a “neoclassical model,” according to which contracts are
understood to be discrete, one-shot exchanges. Two strangers
approach each other, bargain, exchange promises, and either
discharge those promises or breach. If a dispute occurs, and a lawsuit
is filed, the court determines whether a breach has occurred, and
awards damages, based strictly on the contract, together with any
evidence of negotiations that sheds light on the parties’ contractual
intentions. Macneil introduced a new model, the “relational model,”
under which contracts are analyzed as elements of existing
relationships. The relationships are not governed by contractual
intentions, but reflect a variety of influences, including social norms
and the norms of conduct that develop within the relationship. The
parties understand their contracts within the context of their
relationship, and it seems that courts do too, whether or not they
make this explicit. Macneil has argued that the relational model is
the more accurate and useful method, and has urged other scholars
to adopt this view.2
To some extent, events have vindicated Macneil’s views, but the
reality is complex.3 Initially, it must be stressed that the earlier
1
Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Copyright 1999, Eric A. Posner.
Thanks to Richard Craswell and to participants at a conference in honor of Ian
Macneil, Northwestern University Law School, and for the financial support of
the John M. Olin Fund, the Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund, and the Ameritech
Fund in Law and Economics.
2
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Northwestern
University Law Review 854 (1978).
3
In particular, it is hard to believe that the neoclassical model, to the extent that it
overlaps the standard economic approach, has been exhausted. A sample of recent
work along these lines includes Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 94 Yale Law
Journal 97 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Steven Shavell, Information and the
Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L.
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scholarship was not monolithic. Legal realists like Karl Llewellyn
understood that contracts occurred within relationships, and that
powerful social norms may play a greater role in regulating contracts
than the law does,4 an idea illustrated by a well-known article
published by Macauley some years later.5 In addition, much modern
contracts scholarship, while not explicitly embracing Macneil’s
approach, clearly shared his concerns.
To illustrate, consider some of the law and economics work of
the 1970s. Goldberg argues that the relational contract approach
differed from the neoclassical approach by acknowledging that: (1)
information is imperfect and costly; (2) people engage in
opportunism; and (3) outsiders (the courts) will not necessarily
enforce agreements accurately.6 Now these ideas were all firmly
Econ. & Org. 284 (1991) (same); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and
the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615 (1990); Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992) (same); Alan Schwartz, The
Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J.
389 (1994) (same); Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New
Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. Legal Stud. 203. (1997) (contract
modification); Alexander J. Triantis and George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in
Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J. Law & Econ. 163 (1998) (options approach to
contract damages); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24
J. Legal Stud. 139 (1995) (same); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations on the Freedom of Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283 (1995) (restrictions
on contractual freedom); Lars A. Stole, The economics of Liquidated Damage
Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information, 8 J. Law, Econ.
& Org. 582 (1992) (penalty doctrine); Eric Talley, Contract Renegotiation,
Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1195
(1994); Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66
U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1999) (guaranty contracts); Thomas J. Miceli, Contract
Modification When Litigating for Damages Is Costly, 15 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.
87 (1995); Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach
Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 Am. Econ. Rev. 478 (1996). Some other
examples are cited below.
4
As Macneil acknowledges; see Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract,
47 S. Cal.L.Rev. 691, 734 n. 131 (1974).
5
Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? — An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale Law
Journal 704 (1931); Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 American Sociological Review 55 (1963).
6
Victor P. Goldberg, Relational Contract, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of
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established in the law and economics work of the late 1970s and
early 1980s. The work on contract damages by Shavell and others
generally assumed that the parties could not anticipate at zero cost
every contractual contingency, and that is why courts must fill in
contractual gaps by awarding damages.7 All law and economics work
assumed that people would engage in opportunism, for example,
breaching rather than performing if their gains from breach exceeded
their costs of performance, regardless of the loss imposed on the
promisee. The debate between Kronman, Schwartz, and others
about the desirability of specific performance turned, in part, on how
accurately courts could determine the promisee’s loss as a result of
the breach of contract.8 So the debate was explicitly about the
accuracy or inaccuracy of the courts.9
Still, this work has a different flavor from the more recent work
by scholars involved in law and economics. The recent work, more so
than earlier work, reflects Macneil’s focus on problems arising from
long-term or relational contracts. Long-term contracts raise a
straightforward, but seemingly intractable problem: in the long term,
events are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate
future obligations and payments in a way that maximizes the value of
their contract. They will have to anticipate renegotiation as the
future reveals itself, but if the parties expect to renegotiate, then they
cannot bind themselves to a contract, in which case the party whom
events throw in the vulnerable position will be at the mercy of the
Economics and the Law 288 (Peter Newman ed. 1998).
7
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J.
Econ. 466 (1980).
8
See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 351
(1978); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271
(1979).
9
In fact, all of these ideas appeared in articles by economists going back into the
early 1970s, work from which much of the law and economics literature derives.
The economic literature on “incomplete contracts,” which parallels the legal work
on relational contracts, has its roots in this earlier work. See Oliver Hart and
Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in Advances in Economic Theory
5th World Congress 71-155, T. Bewley, ed. (London: Cambridge University
Press). See also Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and
Antitrust Implications (1975). For Macneil’s views, see Ian R. Macneil, Economic
Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a “Rich
Classificatory Apparatus,” 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1018, 1039ff. (1981).
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party whom events favor. Yet somehow parties in the real world
manage to overcome these problems. Relational contracts are
popular and effective, yet not (apparently) because parties can draft a
relatively complete contract that a court will be able to enforce. On
the contrary, if the parties have a dispute, and go to court, they
cannot expect the court to enforce contractual obligations on the
basis of the initial contract, given that the initial contract will most
likely have nothing to say about events occurring many years later.
One of Macneil’s contributions was to help legal scholars to see
that the traditional model, however convenient it was from a
methodological perspective, was inadequate for analyzing this
important side of contractual behavior. But having acknowledged
this, we must proceed with some sort of analysis. If Macneil is right,
and courts cannot resolve contractual disputes by discovering initial
contractual intentions on the basis of documents and other evidence,
cannot use such intentions (even if they exist) to guide behavior late
in the life of a relational contract, cannot enforce contracts in a way
that maximizes their value ex ante, cannot fill in gaps by imagining
the hypothetical bargain—then, what should the courts do?
There are now three main answers in the literature. Macneil’s
original answer was the most ambitious. He argued that courts
should enforce relational contracts by determining what the norms
of the relationship are, and enforcing those norms. Macneil clearly
had in mind something different from, say, the norms that maximize
the value of the contract or the relationship, appealing instead both
to generalized norms of fairness and the particular norms of behavior
that develop within the relationship.10
Goetz and Scott argued that courts should enforce relational
contracts by filling the gaps with whatever terms would maximize
the value of the contractual relationship.11 This may sometimes be
10

See, e.g., Macneil, Economic Analysis, supra note __; Ian R. Macneil, The New
Social Contract (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External,
78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 340, 383-89 (1983). An interesting application is Speidel,
Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw.
U.L.Rev. 369, 370-81 (1981). There is also a flavor of this approach in Gillian
Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 Stanford Law Review 927 (1990).
11
See Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67
Virginia Law Review 1089 (1981); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
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straightforward. When there is a good market for substitute
performances at the time of breach, the court can determine
damages correctly by using market price as a measuring rod. But
more often, this would be highly complicated. Everything has
changed since the contract was signed, the parties have relied on
each other in various ways—having made investments specific to the
relationship—and understandings have changed. If the seller has
made a large relationship-specific investment in the manufacture of a
particular widget, and the buyer refuses to pay for it, the fact that the
market in the meantime has developed a cheap substitute is
irrelevant for determining the proper damages.
Schwartz has recently argued that courts should, on the
contrary, enforce long-term (or relational) contracts in a literal or
“passive” way.12 Suppose that a contract says that the seller must
deliver at time X, and the buyer must pay price Y, every month over
the course of years, with no provisions for change in circumstances.
But circumstances change radically, so that continued performance is
disastrous for one party, a windfall for the other. Schwartz argues
that nonetheless the courts should enforce the contract as written
(indeed, should enforce it through specific performance, not
damages). The parties, after all, know that circumstances might
change. But if they expect to have private information, so that courts
cannot reliably enforce the value-maximizing terms, then allowing
judges to try to figure out these terms would simply produce error.
Literal enforcement also produces error, in the sense that judges
would not enforce the hypothetical value-maximizing terms. But at
least this error would be predictable. And predicting it, the parties
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990). Robert
Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 14 International Review of Law and Economics 215 (1994),
takes a position midway between Goetz and Scott, and Macneil, arguing that
courts should, under certain conditions, identify and apply prevailing commercial
customs in order to resolve contractual disputes, and that these customs will
generally be efficient.
12
See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 Journal of Legal Studies 271
(1992); Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts. In Peter Newman, ed., The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (London: Macmillan Reference
1998).
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will design the contract in such a way that provides each side with
the best incentives to engage in value-maximizing renegotiation when
events finally change. In particular, the parties will choose terms that
are based on information that they believe the court will be able to
verify (such as market prices of inputs) rather than on information
that, even if economically more relevant, they anticipate the court
will not be able to verify (such as the seller’s costs or the buyer’s
demand). Courts benefit parties more by submitting to their
contractual instructions—instructions which are designed precisely
with the courts’ abilities in mind—than by flailing away in a fruitless
attempt at divining the parties contractual goals, or the optimal
terms, or the norms of the relationship.
These theories can be compared according to the attitude they
take toward the competence of the courts. Macneil’s theory places
great confidence in the courts. He assumes not only that they will be
able to understand the nature of the dispute, but also that they will
be able to do a kind of sociological analysis of the parties’
relationship. Goetz and Scott place less confidence in the courts, but
still give them a difficult task. They must be able to determine what
actions are value-maximizing when the dispute arises, a
determination that would require quite an exhaustive understanding
of the relationship, including who made relationship-specific
investments, and how much they contributed to the value generated
by the relationship, and so on. Finally, Schwartz places little
confidence in the courts. They only have to enforce the contract
literally, which means reading the meaning of the contract off its
face while ignoring evidence from the prior and subsequent
relationship.
Among these authors, Schwartz is most explicit about the
assumptions one must make about judicial competence. He points
out that identifying the value-maximizing action in any contractual
relationship is likely to require information that is not available to
the court. One or both of the parties may understand that the seller
should slow down production or the buyer should accept a delay, but
courts, which are complete foreigners to the industry and to the
relationship, are not likely to have, or be able to obtain, the
information that is necessary for this understanding. That is why
Schwartz limits the role of courts when enforcing relational
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contracts.
But one might have doubts about whether Schwartz goes far
enough. Having relieved the court of the impossible burden of
choosing the optimal terms ex post, he places this burden squarely
on the shoulders of the parties ex ante. There is a literature on the
design of contracts that describes the optimal terms in cases such as
this. Schwartz himself relies on this literature in order to justify his
proposal. But the optimal terms identified by the literature are far
more complex than those used in real contracts, and the reason may
be that the problem for which these terms are a solution is too
complex for real people to solve.13
This leaves us with two possibilities. The first is that there are
relatively simple ways for parties to design relational contracts in a
way that exploits courts without putting too big a burden on them.
The second is that parties lack the clairvoyance needed to give courts
the proper guidance if a dispute arises, and courts lack the genius
that would be needed to enforce contracts properly in the absence of
such guidance. The latter possibility is the one that I will explore in
this paper. In a phrase, I assume that courts are radically incompetent
given the demands that are placed on them by relational contracts.
They cannot even engage, reliably, in the minimalist enforcement
that Schwartz assigns to them.
Some might argue that because contract law exists, and parties
freely take steps to ensure that their agreements are legally
enforceable, it must be the case that courts are not radically
incompetent. If they were, people would abandon the formal legal
system. In this paper, I argue, on the contrary, that even if courts are
radically incompetent, people would voluntarily enter legally
enforceable contracts. Indeed, I go farther and argue that many
elements of our legal system make most sense if we understand them
to be a response to the regrettable but unavoidable fact that our
courts are incompetent when it comes to enforcing contracts.
I should immediately add some words of caution. I do not
believe that courts always misunderstand contracts, though I do
believe that they often do. But it is useful, for analytic and expository
purposes, to take the extreme case, and then generalize by relaxing
13
See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard Zeckhauser, Simplicity and
Complexity in Contracts (manuscript, 1999).
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the assumption that the extreme case is always true.
I. Empirical Motivation
Merchants must cooperate with each other in order to make
profits, but cooperation is hampered as always by incentives to cheat.
The long history of commercial behavior is powerful evidence that
merchants can overcome these incentives much of the time—enough
of the time, anyway, to be able to prosper—despite the absence of
legal intervention. One might mention the Lombard and Jewish
bankers in the early modern period, the Maghribi traders, the
Genoese and the Venetians, ethnic Chinese merchants in foreign
countries, Korean and other immigrant groups in the United States,
the successful exploitation of common pools by local groups, and so
on.14 In all of these cases, merchants and others cooperate and
prosper in a lawless environment at the international level or even in
a hostile local legal environment. So one might ask, why is a state
necessary at all for commercial cooperation?
A common answer is that relatively small and homogenous
groups of people can cooperate, whereas strangers in a populous state
cannot. This answer cannot be the whole story. Most people who
belong to the majority population in a state are able to cooperate
without resorting to the threat of legal sanctions. In ordinary life,
people constantly make and keep promises; and legal retaliation for
cheating is never an option because the cost of invoking the law
exceeds the amount at stake. The ordinary wisdom might be revised,
then, to hold that nonlegal cooperation occurs among people in
communities, where information flows freely and reputations are
known, but not among strangers.
14

E.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions
for Collective Action (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1990);
Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders Coalition, 83 American Economic Review 525 (1993);
Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast, Coordination, Commitment,
and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 Journal of Political
Economy 745 (1994); Janet T. Landa, Trust, Ethnicity and Identity: Beyond the
New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and
Gift Exchange (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1994); Eric A. Posner,
The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 University of Chicago Law Review 133 (1996).
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Even so revised, however, this view is unsatisfactory. What are
these contracts among strangers? When a consumer purchases a
stereo at a retail outlet, the consumer and the “store”—whether we
mean the salesclerk, the manager, or the shareholders—are strangers,
but it is rare for a consumer to sue the store if the stereo is broken.
No rational consumer would sue a store over an object worth a few
hundred dollars, when the lawsuit would cost the consumer
thousands of dollars. But a lawsuit is rarely an issue, anyway; the
consumer will return the stereo and receive a refund or additional
merchandise. Most retailers offer warranties and honor them because
they fear damage to their reputation. If the consumer does not honor
a promise to pay for the stereo, the retailer might sue the consumer,
but more likely it will report him to a credit agency that will record
the default on the consumer’s credit report. Lawsuits do not occur,
regardless of who breaches. So the retailer and the consumer are not
really strangers, or if they are, then they embarrass the claim that
nonlegal cooperation does not occur among strangers.
Perhaps, then, the “contracts among strangers” refer to arms’length sales among merchants. Even here, however, reputation and
other nonlegal mechanisms play an important role. Most merchants
belong to trade associations, clubs, and other organizations, which
enable them to meet each other and exchange gossip. A large
company may have thousands of employees, but all the employees
with major responsibilities will join clubs or attend conventions
where they meet their counterparts in other firms. So what appears
to be an arms’-length contract between two anonymous firms is
often the result of negotiations between two friends who belong to
the same social club or sit on the board of the same charitable
organization. An enormous amount of business activity consists of
making contacts, or “networking,” and what does this mean if not
revealing information about oneself to others, and obtaining
information about them in return?
One can go farther. Parties to a contract are almost never
anonymous. In almost all contracts, one party or both parties care
deeply about their reputations. In ordinary commercial contracts
between merchants, both merchants expect to do business with each
other in the future, or at least with other merchants who are likely to
learn about the behavior of the parties. Banks lend money to firms in

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

10

the expectation that the firms will return for credit in the future, an
understanding often represented formally by a revolving credit
contract. Employers and workers understand that employment
contracts cannot describe all the behavior that will be required on
each side. Workers behave properly in order to obtain bonuses and
promotions and in order to avoid being penalized or fired.
Employers behave properly in order to maintain the loyalty of their
workers and to attract workers entering the market. Firms invest a
vast amount of money in making themselves known to consumers,
so if a consumer has a satisfactory experience he will come back, and
he will tell his friends about it.15 Airlines, department stores, and
other businesses enable consumers to build up a reputation as a
repeat player by offering frequent flyer programs (in the first case)
and credit cards (in the second case) that allow the business to keep
track of its customers and reward those who continue to patronize it.
Museums offer memberships in order to distinguish repeat
customers from transitory customers. Even something as transitory
as a stock transaction is constrained by nonlegal sanctions. The buyer
and seller in the secondary market do not deal with each other. They
both deal with a middleman, the broker, who takes pains to develop
a reputation for honesty, and who usually is employed by a firm with
a brand name, built up over years.
So when contracts are small, people do not sue each other
because it is not worthwhile. When contracts are large, people do
not sue each other because they depend on reputation. But if this is
so, what is the role of the law? One can put this question differently.
If the law were adequate for regulating relations among strangers,
then why wouldn’t people rely on the law rather than spending so
much time and effort establishing their reputations for
trustworthiness and learning the reputations of others?
The traditional or neoclassical paradigm of contractual behavior
is not well-equipped to answer these questions.16 This approach
generally assumes that people make contracts because only legal
sanctions will deter a party from cheating on the contract when it is
15

Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 Journal of Political Economy 615 (1981).
16
But see Louis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26
J.L. & Econ. 691 (1983).
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profitable to do so. If each party expected the other to cheat under
such conditions, parties would not enter a contract in the first place.
The value-maximizing court enforces contracts in such a way that
maximizes the ex ante value of the contract, which usually means
allocating obligations in a way that places the risk of any contingency
on the party that can most cheaply bear it and that gives the parties
proper incentives to breach, invest, and engage in related behavior.
Other kinds of behavior are hard to explain if one assumes the
traditional paradigm. Contracting parties are often friends.
Friendships arise not as the natural byproduct of time spent together
and mutual interest; on the contrary, parties spend a great deal of
effort, time, and money trying to make friends. A book publisher
might take a client out to lunch or dinner. Purchasing agents take
suppliers to baseball games, plays and movies, even to strip-tease
joints.17 Business deals are everywhere forged in bars, restaurants, and
private drinking clubs. Business is almost always conducted in a
highly social manner. First, they talk about sports; then, about their
families; and only then, perhaps when the dinner or golf game is
almost over, do they shake hands on the deal.
In the cotton industry, “Merchants take mill buyers on hunting
trips just like in any other business.... In the process, relationships ...
develop[ ]. Over time a buyer gets the idea that he wants to deal
with me not just because of our business relationship, but also
because of our personal relationship. So you tell me, when you want
to do business who will you call, the guy you like or the guy you
don’t like.”18 A major trade association “has sponsored the local
debutante ball, an annual civic cotton carnival, golf tournaments, a
Cotton Wives Club [sic], a well-known domino tournament, and
numerous other civic events. To this day it continues to encourage
social interaction among its members and their families by making
its annual conventions family events.”19 Many businesses, trade
associations, and other industry groups sponsor social and family
events in order to enhance relationships among their employees or
17
Robyn Meredith, Strip Clubs Under Siege as Salesman’s Havens, The New
York Times, September 20, 1997, p. A1.
18
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value
Creation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions (unpublished manuscript), p. 16
(quoting merchant, brackets and ellipsis in original).
19
Id., pp. 20-21.
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members.
If, as I will shortly argue, these phenomena arise because
merchants want nonlegal sanctions to substitute for the law, one
must ask, what is wrong with the law? Scholars acknowledge the
possibility that the law is just not very effective at regulating
commercial transactions, but, as we have seen, they limit the
consequences of this possibility by sharply distinguishing between
relational contracts and one-shot contracts. If courts cannot
determine obligations in long-term, “relational” contracts, contracts
in which many terms are left out, they can determine obligations in
shorter “one-shot” deals.20
This latter claim is difficult to confirm or deny, but let me
mention two reasons why it might not be true. First, although the
number of unpredictable contingencies that can change the value of
a long-term relationship is no doubt enormous, the number of
unpredictable contingencies that can change the value of one-shot
deals is also enormous. The overwhelming variety of contingencies
in the first case does not imply that courts can handle the variety of
contingencies in the second case. The relatively “one-shot” sale of a
house extends over months during which any number of things can
happen, only a small fraction of which can adequately be treated in
the contract. Short-term contracts almost always have tails stretching
indefinitely in the future. A buyer might sue the seller for a defect in
goods discovered months or years after delivery, a suit that requires
the court to determine whether any intervening contingencies are
relevant for the determination of obligations.
Second, courts have trouble understanding the simplest of
business relationships. This is not surprising. Judges must be
generalists but usually they have narrow backgrounds in a particular
field of the law, and they often owe their positions to political
connections, not to merit. Their frequent failure to understand
transactions is well-documented. One survey of cases involving
consumer credit, for example, showed that the judges did not even
understand the concept of present value.21 The judges struck down
contracts because the credit price was higher than the cash price, not
20

See Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, supra note __.
Jeffrey E. Allen and Robert J. Staaf., The Nexus Between Usury, ‘Time Price,’
and Unconscionability in Installment Sales, 14 U.C.C. Law Journal 219 (1982).
21
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taking account of risk and of the time value of money. The authors
showed that the implicit interest rates were reasonable. Even when
judges do not misunderstand basic ideas, we must take their
interpretation of facts on faith. Judges’ reasoning can be evaluated
only against the canned facts described in the opinion, which
themselves are the result of a fact-finding process that does not
inspire confidence. Parties can reasonably believe that given the
varying sophistication of trial judges, lawyers, and juries, the
accidents of discovery, the varying credibility of witnesses, the
vagueness of the law, and so on, that the chance of winning a breach
of contract suit is pretty much random. Skepticism about the quality
of judicial decision-making is reflected in many legal doctrines,
including the business judgment rule in corporate law, which
restrains courts from second-guessing managers and directors, and
the many contract doctrines that restrain courts from secondguessing parties to contracts.
These observations suggest the following possibility. Courts are
not very good at deterring opportunistic behavior in contractual
relationships, but parties are. This is why so much contractual
behavior depends on reputation, ethnic and family connections, and
other elements of nonlegal regulation, and not on carefully written
and detailed contracts enforced by disinterested courts. The next
section analyzes this hypothesis more formally, and suggests an
answer to the question why, if they cannot rely on courts to enforce
contracts properly, people so frequently take pains to ensure that
their contracts are legally enforceable.
II. The Model
The claim behind the model is that even if courts cannot
determine who breached a contract, or whether a contract has been
breached, they can deter opportunistic behavior. This claim might
sound implausible, but the key to it is that parties choose when they
want to use courts and when they do not, so even an
uncomprehending court can serve useful purposes as long as it allows
itself to be manipulated by the parties. Parties use the courts as a
commitment device, which allows them to make credible promises to
perform an action and allows them to rely on the promises of the
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other.22
The argument has two steps. First, I claim that nonlegal
sanctions deter breaches when the payoff to the breaching party from
breaching is not too high. The standard repeat prisoner’s dilemma
explains such run-of-the-mill commercial cooperation, which is no
doubt the most common kind of cooperation. The law is needed
only for ensuring cooperation when the payoff from breach is
relatively high. Second, I show that when the payoff from breaching
is high, parties can protect themselves ex ante by entering a legally
enforceable contract. But the protection does not result from the
ability of courts to punish the party that breaches. It is assumed that
courts are not able to acquire the information that they would need
in order to determine liability and harm. The protection results
because the victim of the breach, if he cares about his reputation, can
credibly threaten to inflict mutual harm by bringing a negative-sum
lawsuit.
A. Some Preliminaries: How People Cooperate
The model relies on the assumption that people are able to
cooperate in diverse settings. To understand this assumption,
imagine that contractual relationships take the form of prisoner’s
dilemmas. Seller offers a customized widget of a certain quality, and
Buyer offers to pay on delivery. Seller fears that Buyer will breach by
refusing to accept delivery and holding out for a lower price; Buyer
fears that Seller will breach by selling the widget to a third party who
offers to pay more. If the parties cannot provide assurance that they
will not breach, they might not enter the contract in the first place.
The neoclassical or traditional law and economics view is that
contract law provides this needed assurance. If one party breaches,
the other party will have a remedy. So a party will not breach, or if
he does, the victim will not be injured. With this assurance, Seller
has the proper incentive to invest in the customized widget, and
Buyer has the proper incentive to invest in anticipation of delivery.
But this description of contract law is highly idealized, and we
will not rely on it. We will assume to the contrary that courts are
radically incompetent, so they cannot enforce promises in an
22
The term, and the basic insight, come from Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy
of Conflict 24-28 (1960).
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accurate way. But we also assume that run-of-the-mill cooperation is
possible in the absence of the courts and the law.
There are many explanations for how people are able to
cooperate in the absence of legal sanctions, and this is not the place
to survey them or to go into much depth. One common explanation
is that when people have repeated interactions with each other, they
have an incentive not to breach or “cheat” in one interaction, because
then people will not trust them in later interactions. In the simplest
case, Seller does not break her promise to deliver the customized
widget, because Buyer is a valued customer, and she does not want to
lose him. Seller expects that Buyer will place periodic orders for
additional widgets in the future, but only if Seller has not breached
in the past. Buyer similarly does not break his promise to accept
delivery, because he expects to place additional orders in the future,
and anticipates that Seller will refuse to deliver if Buyer has breached
in the past. Because each party invests in the relationship—Seller, by
customizing to the Buyer’s needs, and Buyer, by modifying his
factory in anticipation of the Seller’s products—each party prefers
performance by the other to whatever substitute may be available on
the market. As long as both parties value future payoffs to a
sufficient degree and as long as the value of breach is never too high,
it is possible (as a matter of theory) and likely (as a matter of
common sense) that they will not breach in any round.
The argument can be extended. Buyer might not anticipate
purchasing additional widgets from Seller, but does expect to
purchase additional goods from other sellers, and these sellers are
likely to hear about Buyer’s past interaction with Seller. Buyer does
not breach his contract with Seller because he fears that if he does,
these other sellers will refuse to deal with him, cutting him off from
important sources of supply in the future.
The model has two important implications, both of which have
been mentioned. The first is that cooperation is more likely when
parties have low discount rates. I will say a little more about this
point below, but it has little to do with the main argument of this
paper. The second implication is more important. The threat to
retaliate can deter opportunism in the repeat prisoner’s dilemma only
if the payoff from opportunism is not too high. Suppose the contract
price for the widget is $10 in the example above; Buyer anticipated
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that he would value it at $12 when it is delivered, and thus would
obtain a profit of $2. In fact, because Buyer’s own customers reduce
their orders for the product for which the widget is an input, Buyer’s
valuation of the widget falls to $9 and thus his profit is -$1. Buyer
would like to breach but understands that under the contract he bore
the risk of fluctuation of demand for his product. He knows that if
he breaches in order to save $1, he can expect Seller to refuse to deal
with him in the future, and this will cost him, say, $5 in future
profits, in present value terms. Buyer absorbs the loss and declines to
breach, because future payoffs worth $5 exceed the current savings of
$1.
Suppose alternatively that Buyer’s valuation plummets to $0,
perhaps because his employees strike. Now the Seller’s threat of
retaliation will not deter Buyer from breaching the contract. If Buyer
breaches, he saves $10, which is higher than the $5 he would lose as
a result of Seller’s retaliation. This is an example of what I will call
high-value opportunism, which is defined as opportunism that cannot
be deterred by the threat of (nonlegal) retaliation. The earlier case is
an example of low-value opportunism, which will not ordinarily occur
because of nonlegal sanctions.23
There are additional complexities that need not detain us for
long. I will just mention that I have argued elsewhere that much of
the odd and interesting behavior associated with contracting is
explained by the importance of signaling that one is a “good
cooperator,” or, in terms of the model, that one has a low discount
rate. In the model, everyone has private information about his own
discount rate.24 Those with low discount rates want to persuade
others that they have low discount rates, because that makes them
attractive contractual partners—the kind who is unlikely to cheat in
the repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. Those with high discount rates
want to persuade others that they also have low discount rates,
because if it is revealed that their discount rates are high, no one else
will want to enter relationships with them. These assumptions
produce a phenomenon known as “signaling,” in which the good
23

See Posner, Groups, supra note __, at 155-61.
See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the
Law, 27 Journal of Legal Studies 765 (1998); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social
Norms ch. 2 (Harvard, forthcoming 2000).
24
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types take costly, nonproductive actions in order to distinguish
themselves from the bad types, on the assumption that the bad types
lose more from imitating these actions than they gain by entering
relationships and cheating other people.
The various behaviors I described above—dinners, lunches,
parties, clubs, gift-giving, charitable activity, and so on—are
consistent with the signaling theory. They are expensive, and
although people may enjoy these activities, there is little reason to
believe that they engage in them just because they enjoy them. Most
people would rather go to dinner with their (real) friends than with
their business associates; most people taken out to dinner by their
business associates would prefer the money value of the meal. But
cash gifts cannot serve as a signal because of their fungibility. If X
gives cash to Y, then X cannot know whether Y is attracted to X for
X’s business or for X’s money. In bilateral signaling, both sides must
waste time, effort, and money. These wasteful actions constitute
what might be called commercial culture, the idiosyncratic activities
that accompany all commercial behavior despite not directly
generating value and in fact having the opposite effect.
The signaling theory has little to do with the model I discuss in
this paper, but I mention it because it suggests why the traditional
model of contract law is inadequate. If it were true, we would not
observe the commercial behavior that we see in the real world.
Parties would not try to become friends, exchange gifts, mix
commercial and social activities, form clubs and associations, and so
on, if they could rely on the courts to deter opportunism in
contractual relationships. They would not be offended by breaches
but be indifferent between breaches and remedies. They would not
shun people who have proven unreliable in past contracts because
they could rely on courts to deter unreliable behavior in future
contracts. Indeed, the standard conception cannot explain why
reputation is the central element of commercial transactions, why so
much of commercial success is tied up with the creation and
maintenance of reputation for fair play.
B. The Role of Contract Law
So far I have explained how nonlegal sanctions deter low-value
opportunism. What then, is the role of contract law? The answer is
that contract law serves to deter certain kinds of high-value
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opportunism, even under the assumption that courts are radically
incompetent.
We start by defining what is meant by radical incompetence.
Assume that a legal system exists but that courts are unable to
determine whether a party to a contract has broken a promise. To be
more precise, assume that a person can ask a court to give him a
remedy for breach of contract, but that the court is so prone to error
that its decisions are random as to liability, with damages being
represented by an unbiased distribution around the amount at stake.
Suppose, for example, that X cheats Y, with the result that 50 is
transferred to X at a cost of 100 to Y. Y sues for 100. The court
holds with 50% probability in favor of X and 50% probability in
favor of Y. If the court holds for Y, damages will be normally
distributed around 100. If the court holds for X, damages will be
normally distributed around 0 (with negative damages interpreted to
mean that the court holds in favor of X on a counterclaim for a
positive amount). The assumption can be understood as one of
judicial incompetence or error-proneness but it is equivalent to the
assumption that whatever the intelligence and sophistication of
judges, parties cannot anticipate and contract about any
contingencies in a sufficiently fine-grained way to provide guidance
to such judges.25
I also assume that even though a court cannot determine
whether a promise has been performed or breached, it can determine
whether the parties intended to enter a contract. I will defend this
assumption below.
Imagine that two parties, Seller and Buyer, enter a contract
whose ex ante value to each exceeds the value of the next best
opportunity. The contractual relationship has the form of a repeat
prisoner’s dilemma, so that the ex ante value of the contract is
realized only if each party can overcome its incentive to defect. A
party always observes a defection (that is, a breach or instance of
“cheating”), and can retaliate by refusing to cooperate in later rounds.
25

Existing work on judicial error does not make such an extreme assumption. See,
e.g., Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 279 (1986); Gillian
Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23
Journal of Legal Studies 159 (1994).
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A court cannot observe a defection. In the standard vocabulary,
defections are observable but not verifiable.
Figure 1 depicts a simplified version of the relationship, one in
which only Buyer has the chance to engage in opportunism (but this
is not essential to the argument). Seller moves first by signing a
contract to sell a widget, or not. If she refuses to sign, payoffs are
assumed to be 0 for each party. Next, Buyer chooses between
cooperating (that is, paying for deliver) or cheating (that is, rejecting
delivery). If he cooperates, payoffs are P for each party. If Buyer
cheats payoffs are D for Buyer and S for Seller: D>P>0>S. For now,
assume that the game ends at that point, and there are no further
rounds.
(P, P)
perform
B
K
S

breach

no K

(S, D)

(0, 0)

Figure 1: Payoffs for (S, B)
The game so far is a simple one-sided prisoner’s dilemma.
Buyer gains more by cheating than by cooperating in round 2, so
Seller must expect that Buyer will cheat in round 2. Because Seller
prefers 0 to the sucker payoff S, Seller will not enter the contract in
the first place. The result is that the potential gain, 2P, is not
realized.
As an aside, note that the solution to this problem under the
traditional approach is to direct the court to award damages to Seller
if Buyer breaches, damages equal to P-S. This ensures that Buyer
will either perform (when D+S<2P) or breach but fully compensate
Seller for his loss (so-called “efficient breach,” when D+S>2P), in
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which case S will have the proper incentive to enter the valuemaximizing contract in round 1.26 But this solution is available only
if courts can determine whether Buyer breaches, and award the right
level of damages, conditions that violate the assumption of radical
judicial incompetence. Under the latter assumption, cooperation is
not possible, and the bad outcome, where Seller does not enter the
contract in the first place, is unavoidable—at least if the game ends
at round 2.
But suppose there is a round 3, and in this round Seller has the
option to sue Buyer or not. Figure 2 depicts the game with this third
round. If Seller does not sue Buyer, the round 3 payoffs are the same
as the round 2 payoffs, namely (S, D) for Seller and Buyer
respectively. If Seller sues, then both sides incur a litigation cost C.
The reason is that litigation is a negative sum game: one party must
pay the other party damages or neither pays the other damages, but
in either case both parties must invest a great deal of time and
money in lawyers and litigation. Because of judicial incompetence,
we assume that expected damages are the same for both parties, but
this assumption is not essential.
(P, P)
perform
B

(S + R – C, D – C)

K

sue

S

breach

no K

(0, 0)

S

not sue

(S, D)

Figure 2: Payoffs for (S, B)
26

I assume away a number of complications that are well-rehearsed in the
literature. The most lucid discussion remains Richard Craswell, Contract
Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 Southern
California Law Review 630 (1988).
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If these assumptions are plausible, and Seller can make a
credible threat to sue Buyer, then Buyer might refrain from cheating.
Buyer’s expected payoff if Seller sues is D-C. That is, whether or not
Buyer ends up winning the lawsuit, he must expect that on average
he will lose C, and this must be subtracted from the payoff from
cheating. When Buyer decides whether to cheat in round 2, he
compares the payoff from cheating and then being sued (D-C), with
the payoff from cooperating (P). If P>D-C, then Buyer will
cooperate. We will discuss in a moment whether C is likely to be
high enough to produce this outcome; for now, note that the fear of
a lawsuit will deter Buyer from cheating if C is high enough, that is,
if C>D-P.
But would Buyer have this fear? Buyer would fear a lawsuit only
if Seller can credibly threaten to sue if Buyer cheats her. But one
might doubt whether Seller’s threat is credible in a world of
incompetent courts. Suppose that Buyer decides to cheat Seller. If
Seller does not sue, her payoff is S. If Seller does sue, her payoff is SC. Because S-C<S, Seller will not sue. But if Seller will not sue, then
Buyer has nothing to fear and might as well cheat, in which case the
incompetent courts do not serve to deter opportunism.
To avoid this outcome, one must make another assumption.
Seller (and Buyer) cares about having a reputation among third
parties for being tough: if anyone cheats her, then she will retaliate
by suing. Seller wants this reputation, because if other buyers in the
future believe it, they will not (usually) cheat her. This reputation is
credible, as long as Seller actually sues anyone who cheats her. But
now it pays Seller to sue anyone who cheats her, as long as the shortterm loss, C, is offset by the long-term gain resulting from the future
contracts, in which Buyer or other buyers do not cheat Seller. This
long-term gain, R, is the value of having a reputation for suing
people who cheat you.27
27

One might make different assumptions about how much information the third
parties have. In the simplest case, the third parties know who cheated. By
hypothesis, this knowledge does not deter Buyer from cheating because Buyer has
a high-value opportunity. But it is enough to give Seller an incentive to sue, and
the suit is what deters Buyer. (Imagine that Seller deals with these third parties
more than Buyer does; or Buyer’s gain from cheating is high compared to Seller’s
loss.) In the other extreme, third parties do not know whether Buyer cheated. If
that is the case, in the current model Seller may have no incentive to sue, because
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Although C must be high enough to deter Buyer from cheating,
C cannot be higher than R, Seller’s gain from having a good
reputation. If C is too high, then Seller would not sue Buyer after
Buyer cheats, and knowing this, Buyer would cheat. Because C must
exceed the difference between D and P, it follows that if D is very
high relative to P, Seller cannot credibly deter Buyer from cheating.
Buyer knows that Seller must impose a very high cost on him, but
because an expensive lawsuit would hurt Seller too much, Seller
would prefer taking the reputational hit. The availability of
incompetent courts, then, enables more cooperation than would exist
in their absence, but clearly—and intuitively—does not make full
cooperation inevitable. Put otherwise, incompetent courts will deter
some of the high-value opportunism that cannot be deterred by
nonlegal sanctions; but they cannot guarantee that the very highestvalue opportunism will not occur.28
An important question is how C is determined. Notice that C is
not the same as, say, expectation damages. When Seller sues, she can
spend as much on litigation as she wants to. How much will she
spend? She will not settle with Buyer, because then she will not
obtain a reputation for toughness. She must spend enough that
observers see that she is willing to impose enough costs on Buyer so
that Buyer gains nothing from cheating. If we make the plausible
assumption that one’s chances of winning a lawsuit increase with the
amount of money one spends on litigation, then Seller can force
Buyer to incur litigation costs simply by incurring litigation costs
herself. To prevent Seller from winning, Buyer will try to match
third parties do not know whether Seller is suing because Buyer cheated her or is
suing in order to persuade them that she is tough. But real cases no doubt fall
between the two extremes. In such cases, third parties have more information
about Buyer’s actions than courts do but less than Buyer and Seller do. The
consequence of such partial information is to blunt the reputation effect on which
the model relies but not to eliminate it.
28
Seller will enter the contract, and Buyer will not cheat, when R>C, P>D-C, and
P>0. It follows that contracts will occur when D<P+R. When D>P+R, Seller does
not enter the contract in round 0 because she knows that the threat to sue will not
deter Buyer from cheating in round 2. To sum up, there are three possibilities. (1)
D<P: contracting is possible because Buyer either gains little from defecting or
because nonlegal sanctions are effective (“low-value opportunism); (2) P<D<P+R:
contracting is possible because of incompetent courts; and (3) D>P+R: contracts
are not possible.
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Seller, thus keeping the odds of prevailing as even as possible. So
Seller will choose C, such that C>D-P. But because Seller will not
spend more on litigation than she could gain from an enhanced
reputation, she will choose C, such that C<R. In sum, Seller will
choose C in the range (D-P, R).
Note that Seller’s expenditure on C is, as game theorists say,
“off the equilibrium path.” Under the model’s assumptions, it will
not happen. If D<P+R, then Buyer will not cheat, because Seller’s
threat to sue, and thus to impose litigation costs as great as Buyer’s
gains from cheating, is credible. If D>P+R, then Seller will not enter
the contract in the first place, because she knows that she will not be
able to deter Buyer from cheating. Of course, in the real world Seller
does not have perfect information, will sometimes enter contracts
despite the fact that D>P+R, and sometimes sue even though the net
present value of the suit is less than zero. Then litigation will occur
unless the parties settle; but sometimes the parties will not settle
because of the same imperfect information that causes Seller to enter
the contract in the first place. But as long as parties do not err too
often, they can rely even on radically incompetent courts to deter
certain forms of high-value opportunism.
Now return to the assumption that the parties can choose
whether or not their relationship will be subject to legal intervention.
This assumption is necessary to the argument. If a party could
involuntarily be subject to contractual liability, or if parties could not
choose to be contractually liable, then people would have an
incentive to make fraudulent claims that strangers have entered
contracts with them, as a way of extracting value from the strangers.
In addition, a party always has an interest in binding the other party
but not himself. Seller might be willing to enter a legally binding
contract with Buyer; but Seller would prefer a legal relationship in
which she (the Seller) is not bound and Buyer is. So if Buyer cheats,
Seller can credibly threaten to sue Buyer. But if Seller spots a good
opportunity to cheat, she can cheat without fearing a lawsuit from
the Buyer. To prevent these results, it must be the case that our
incompetent court is not too incompetent: it must be able to
distinguish a legally binding promise from a non-binding promise.
Courts are too incompetent to fill gaps in contracts, but not too
incompetent to determine whether the parties intended to make
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legal remedies available to each other.
Is this a plausible claim? The answer turns on an important
difference between the desire to subject oneself to legal enforcement,
which is a binary yes/no issue, and the desire to accomplish some
cooperative goal, which involves constantly shifting and always
idiosyncratic positions. Courts can, in advance, state that certain
signals will be interpreted as a desire to subject oneself to legal
enforcement, and they can pick those signals that they find easiest to
interpret. If courts announce that a seal is a signal of a desire for legal
enforcement, the parties can unambiguously signal their desire for
legal enforcement by attaching a seal to their written contract. If
courts say that a writing alone is necessary, the parties can use a
writing. By contrast, courts can only with difficulty state that certain
promises will be interpreted in one way, and other promises will be
interpreted in another way, because there are too many kinds of
promises that parties might find valuable in a particular business
context.29
A crisp example of this phenomenon—confidence in courts’
ability to evaluate the use of form but not to determine obligations
and evaluate performance of them—comes from family law. Most
people believe that courts have little ability to evaluate an ongoing
marital relationship. The evolving obligations are too complex for an
outsider to understand. Although courts and other agencies
intervene more in family relationships than they did in the past, it
remains true that families enjoy a great deal of autonomy. If
dissolution of marriages is easier than before, courts no longer try to
determine who was at fault. But—now, as in the past—parties are
required to commit themselves or not to legal enforcement by either
getting married or not getting married. It is thus assumed that courts
can determine whether two people are married. We see here the
sharp distinction between the assumption that courts can understand
the use of form to signal an intention to enter a legal relationship
and the assumption that they cannot understand the obligations that
arise within that relationship.
29

The contrast is a bit overstated. Courts do state that certain promises will be
interpreted in certain ways. For example, they often say that if an employment
contract does not provide expressly for tenure or termination for cause, it will be
interpreted as employment at will.
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C. Summary
Radically incompetent courts can deter high-value opportunism
that ordinary nonlegal sanctions cannot deter, but only under the
following conditions. First, the promisor (the party facing the
decision whether to engage in high-value opportunism) receives a
higher payoff from performing than by breaching and incurring
litigation cost C. Second, the promisee gains more by maintaining a
reputation for toughness (in the form of future business) than by
avoiding the cost of litigation. Third, the third parties would have at
least partial information about who engaged in opportunism if such
opportunism occurred. Fourth, the court can determine whether the
parties intended to be legally bound with greater than zero accuracy.
The model of contract law that I have described does not put
great demands on the courts. It is as though two parties to a
relationship agreed that if they had a dispute, both parties would
have a finger chopped off by a government agent. Neither party
cheats, because he believes that the other would retaliate by invoking
his right to have the mutual sanction imposed. The cheated party
will credibly retaliate with a lawsuit, because otherwise he risks
obtaining a reputation as a softy, in which case he will be unable to
avoid being cheated the next time he plays this game. The
government agent’s role is just to chop off fingers if one person
complains. The government is like a parent, who punishes both
children who are fighting rather than only the child who started the
dispute. Even if you do not know which child is at fault, you can
discourage future misbehavior, for each child knows that he will be
punished if he engages in such misbehavior. Like the parent, the
government does not have to determine who is right and who is
wrong. The purpose of contract law is to enable parties to have the
government penalize both if they have a dispute; and contract
doctrines merely give parties a reliable way to indicate ex ante their
desire for such government involvement, and to limit the size and
the variance of the penalty to something close to what should be
sufficient: a finger rather than a head.
This theory answers the question why, if nonlegal sanctions are
so powerful, people take care to ensure that their contracts comply
with the formalities of contract law. The answer is that although
nonlegal sanctions are powerful, they cannot deter defections when
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the benefit from defection is high enough. When this occurs, the
injured party benefits from the contract even incompetently
enforced. And both parties, not knowing in advance whether they
will be injured by the price change or benefited by it, agree to the
contract in order to protect themselves from defection.
If this view of contract law seems improbable and perverse,
consider the similarities between the role it assigns to the courts and
the historical role of related institutions. An early remedy for legal
wrongs was the trial by battle, which entitled the complainant to face
the defendant in a tournament. And an extremely important non- or
semilegal institution for dispute resolution—in every major country
and in every period of history before the twentieth century—has
been the duel. Both forms of dispute resolution present the following
puzzle. If the outcome of the dispute depends on skill with arms,
and not on the reliable discovery of fault, then the tournament and
the duel do not deter opportunism but give skillful people a license
to do whatever they want, a license that, ironically, they would not
want, since then no one would trust them to keep their contracts.
The history of dueling reveals many practices that took away this
advantage, including the practices of giving the challenged person
the choice of weapons and, in the case of pistols, forcing the parties
to use highly inaccurate pistols at a great distance.30 In the Icelandic
holmgang dueling parties wore so much armor that death was rare.31
By analogy, efforts over time to make courts harder or easier to use,
the liability rules more or less expansive, the damages more or less
generous—all of this is like increasing or reducing the distance
between duelists, modifying the weapons they use, adding or
subtracting the armor they wear, and so on. These practices made
the outcome of the duel a matter of luck, much as the outcome of a
dispute before a radically incompetent court is a matter of luck.
Aleatory dispute resolution mechanisms may well be functional.
They persist over time because they serve social purposes. They
succeed for two reasons. People do not cheat because they fear being
subject to enormous losses; they do not settle because they fear being
30

Warren F. Schwartz, et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting
Efficiently?, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 321 (1984).
31
William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in
Saga Iceland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990).
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thought to be cowards.
III. Legal Implications
A. Form
The value of a legally enforceable promise as a commitment
device depends on the freedom of parties to opt into or out of legal
liability. The ability to impose legal liability on a stranger without ex
ante consent would give people the ability to use courts strategically
to extract wealth from each other. This was a problem with the duel:
a highly skillful person or a risk-preferring person can threaten to
challenge people to duels if they do not do what he wants them to
do, and his skill or boldness enables him to overcome the element of
randomness. In England, great nobles feared such challenges from
lesser nobles, and so had to isolate themselves or surround
themselves with bodyguards in order to deprive the lesser nobles of
the opportunity to challenge them to a duel.32 Similarly, if X and
three friends can persuasively but fraudulently say before a jury that
Y had agreed to buy some stock at time 0 but had since breached his
promise because prices had fallen at time 1, then any con artist can
use the court system in order to effect wealth-decreasing transfers
from hapless victims to himself. To prevent such behavior, contract
law must distinguish between obligations that have been voluntarily
incurred and those that are fraudulently asserted.33
The mechanism for making this distinction is form. Courts and
legislatures establish certain forms, like the seal or the writing, as a
way of indicating a desire for legal enforcement; by violating these
forms one can indicate one’s desire to avoid legal enforcement.
Form, then, takes center stage in the commitment model,
whereas in the standard one-shot model it had been elbowed into
the wings. Under the standard model it was understood that form is
a way for parties to signal their desire to opt into or out of legal
enforcement. It was recognized that the cost of forms is that
sophisticated people can use them to bind others who believe
32

V.G. Kiernan, The Duel in European History: Honor and the Reign of
Aristocracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988).
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See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1982).

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

28

themselves not legally bound and to avoid binding themselves when
others believe them legally bound. The benefit of forms is that they
enable people to avoid legal liability.34 These points remain relevant.
But because there was no theory explaining why parties would want
to opt out of legal enforcement, there was no explanation for why
form mattered. Indeed, the standard theory assumed that courts
should determine optimal terms in order to fill in gaps, and as long
as courts are assumed to be doing that, there is no reason why parties
would want to opt out of legal enforcement.
This is why modern writers on contracts have such trouble with
people like Holmes and Hand, who believed that parties’ intentions
are irrelevant as long as their contracts satisfy formalities.35 The
formalist approach seems perverse: why should it matter if parties
adhere to a form or not, when we really care about their intentions?
If a party fails to dot an i, we shouldn’t let that tiny omission prevent
us from enforcing the contract. But this modern view assumes away
the problem that form is intended to meet—the problem whether we
know the parties’ intentions. It assumes that courts can determine
the parties’ intentions from context and common sense. If this
assumption is correct, then courts should ignore form. But Holmes’
and Hand’s view make sense under the assumption of judicial
incompetence. Courts cannot read parties’ intentions from context,
34

See, e.g., Ayres and Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note __; Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke Law Journal 557 (1992).
35
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (M. Howe, ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1963); Hand’s most famous
remark on this subject can be found in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New
York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911):
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it
were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the
words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law
imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some
mutual mistake, or something else of the sort. Of course, if it appear by
other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar
meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will
prevail, but only by virtue of the other words, and not because of their
unexpressed intent.

29

Contract Law and Judicial Error

so they must rely on the forms that the parties choose. There is no
evidence for the modern conviction that judges can reliably
determine intentions. And although courts are no longer as
formalistic as they used to be, there is no reason to believe that this
trend is desirable, that judges are more competent than they used to
be, or that contracts are more complex, or that the old attitude was
wrong. The modern view is based on an empirical hunch, and no
more, and on this basis contract law has slowly shed some of its
formal requirements.36
The formalist approach requires that courts or legislatures
choose the form that parties must satisfy in order to convey their
desire that a court intervene if a dispute arises. A historical example
is the seal. In order to obtain a legal remedy for breach of certain
kinds of promises, the promisee had to produce a document that
bore the promisor’s stamp in hardened wax. No doubt one could
forge seals, but it must have been difficult to do so. Because the
promisor would not have placed his seal on the document unless he
wanted to make himself vulnerable to legal enforcement, the seal
could serve the purpose of form.
The problem with the seal was that it was expensive and
cumbersome. Over the years, various substitutes emerged. For
certain contracts, a writing and a signature would serve the purpose.
Again, one can forge a signature, but doing so is difficult, and laws
against forgery increased the risk. For relatively low-value, shortterm contracts, the requirements of form are now quite minimal, but
they remain significant. The contract must be based on a quid pro
quo; there must be evidence of something like an offer and
acceptance; the terms of the original contract must be sufficiently
clear and definite; and so on.
It is clear, then, that the formal requirements of a contract, or of
a kind of contract, can vary across a range, from minimal to maximal.
Costly form protects people who do not enter contracts: they are less
likely to be held obliged to keep a promise they did not make. But
costly form also increases the cost of business for those who want to
obligate themselves. Cheap form reduces the cost of entering
36
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contracts, but increases the risk of being held liable through fraud or
by accident. The proper tradeoff will depend on circumstances, will
never be obvious, and will change as the underlying incentives
change.37
The formal requirements of a contract differ from the rules of
contract interpretation in a significant way: the former are selfcorrecting, the latter are not. To see why, observe that when courts
change a form, or even purport to abandon form in favor of loose
standards, parties in subsequent contracts can always respond by
mimicking approved contracts as closely as possible. Even if a court
says that it applies a standard, cautious lawyers will draft the next
contract with an eye toward the contract that the court approved,
because in case of legal dispute the lawyers can plausibly argue that
since the last contract was enforced, and the current contract is
similar to it, the standard that approved the last contract would
approve the current contract as well. When this happens, the earlier
contract sets a pattern and effectively becomes a new form to which
parties adhere. And when parties want to avoid liability in the wake
of expansive standards, like that of Hoffman v. Red Owl,38 they
protect themselves by requiring potential contractual partners to
issue waivers up until a contract is signed. By contrast, when courts
misinterpret contracts, there is little that parties can do except try to
make their contracts more explicit, which is a costly and uncertain
process.
B. Damages, Excuses
Suppose that Seller and Buyer enter a contract in which the
payoff from mutual cooperation is (100, 100), the payoff when Seller
defects and Buyer cooperates is (110, 50) and vice versa, and the
payoff when both defect is (70, 70). If the court had perfect
information, it might award damages equal to 50 against the person
who defects when the other cooperates, as this would compensate
the loser while deterring future cheaters.
Suppose that Buyer sues for failure to deliver, and claims
damages of $X. Seller countersues, claiming that Buyer breached by
failing to provide specifications, and claims damages of $X. Suppose
37
38
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further that Seller and Buyer believe that the court, far from being
perfect, will randomly choose an amount in this range, that is from
-$X to $X; and that each can improve his chance of winning $1 by
spending $1 on litigation. Then Seller and Buyer will each spend
$2X in litigation in order to avoid a loss of $2X. If, for example,
Seller sues for $50, and Buyer countersues for $50, they would each
spend $100 in litigation costs.
Observe that the $100 expected cost for each party, C, serves
the purpose of commitment. If each party can credibly impose a
$100 litigation cost on the other if cheating occurs, the ex ante
payoff from defection is $10 (if S or B defects) or -$30 (if both
defect), which is lower than the ex ante payoff from cooperation
when the other person cooperates, which remains $100. Ex post, the
parties face a strong incentive to settle for an award of $0, rather
than spend $100 each for an expected gain of $0, but they resist this
incentive in order to maintain a reputation for toughness.
Although this result is good, it is not optimal. Commitment
would be possible if the parties could agree not to spend more than
$11 to litigate, since this amount exceeds the $10 payoff from
defection. When parties are unable to settle, they will spend $200
when they should spend no more (or less) than $20, and ex ante an
agreement that required a joint payment of $20 in case of any
dispute would provide adequate deterrence without risking mutual
annihilation should a dispute nonetheless occur. But the parties
could not make such an agreement ex ante; and ex post any
agreement to settle might be taken by observers to indicate that the
parties are not tough, and can be exploited in the future. This would
be like two duelists agreeing that they will fire at each other with cap
guns.39
Several features of contract law mitigate this problem. Contract
doctrines strictly limit the size of damage awards.40 Examples of such
doctrines include the Hadley rule and the penalty doctrine, and rules
that prohibit awards for emotional or speculative losses. Thus, the
39
As noted above, technically this behavior is off the equilibrium path, but would
occur in a model in which the parties (more realistically) have imperfect
information and make mistakes.
40
Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies:
An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale Law Journal 369
(1990).
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parties would not expect the court to award them between -$50 and
$50, but to award them an amount in a narrower range. Thus, they
would not spend $100 each on litigation, but say $90, $80 or less.
In addition, the excuse doctrines limit contract liability, and
these doctrines serve this desirable purpose even if, consistent with
my assumption of judicial incompetence (and, many would say, with
the case law), they are applied randomly. The reason is that if the
range is, say, -$80 to $80, the excuse doctrine means that
occasionally courts will award $0 rather than -$80 or $80. Thus, the
average award declines, and so will C.41
All of this might seem like awfully rough justice, but that may
be the best we can do in an imperfect world. Dueling was also rough
justice. The rules of dueling, including the use of seconds to
intervene, the insertion of elements of chance to even out differences
in skill, and the reliance on weapons that reduce the risk and amount
of harm, are elements that, like contract doctrine, preserve the
deterrent effect of the institution while ensuring that harm does not
exceed by too much the amount necessary for this deterrent effect.
Contract law is best understood as a modern version of dueling,
indeed an improvement insofar as it eliminates the need for violence
and physical harm, reduces the variance of the outcome, and
minimizes the possibility of opportunism.
C. Interpreting Contracts
If courts are radically incompetent, they should not bother
trying to interpret contracts or providing reasons for their decisions,
but should instead flip a coin. They clearly do not do this. They may
decide randomly, but if they do, one must explain why they bother to
invent an elaborate justification for the outcome. Why not render a
judgment without providing reasons?
To answer this question, one must first recognize that because
we do not claim that courts decide matters of form randomly, the use
of reasons to explain such matters does not present a puzzle. If we
assume that courts can adequately decide whether a contract satisfies
41

The argument assumes that Seller obtains R simply if she sues Buyer after Buyer
cheats. One might alternatively assume that R is an increasing function of C,
because future parties are more likely to be impressed by Seller’s toughness when
Seller spends a lot on litigation rather than a little.
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formalities, then they should give their reasons in order to provide
guidance to parties in the future.
The puzzle concerns the judicial practice of explaining why the
promisor’s performance either satisfies or violates the contract. It is
interesting to note that in the old days, courts did not perform this
function, leaving it instead to the jury; and even today, that often
remains the case. But courts cannot avoid performing this function
when the contract must be interpreted, and when parties attempt to
overturn a jury’s decision or prevent the jury from making a decision.
The jury, of course, can be considered a randomizer par excellence.
In any event, the answer is clear as long as judges are not
perfectly incompetent but occasionally right. Even if they are right
only rarely, they can deter bad behavior by exerting effort to discover
whether the promisor breached or not. A slightly more subtle answer
is that courts like to moralize, either as a self-indulgence or as a way
of providing a general sort of guidance about what they think is good
business practice.42 But the general lesson of the model is that even if
we are skeptical when courts claim that a contract means X, because
the contract must have meant blah-blah for if it had not, the parties
would have said Y, etc.,—and what lawyer has not occasionally felt
the force of this skepticism?—we can still conclude that contract law,
and judicial enforcement of contracts, serve the important social
purpose of enabling parties to engage in value-generating exchanges.

42
See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009 (1997).
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